The lead-to-completed-project conversion rate was running substantially below what the operating model assumed. Lead gen was Porch's revenue engine, which made the gap company-existential.

The original product roadmap had a home-ownership platform on it, designed for long-term retention of homeowners after they'd been serviced. Building the retention layer assumed a service flow that worked. The service flow didn't work. Asking users who hadn't received good service to commit to a long-term relationship would only make the customer experience worse. The home-ownership platform was being built on a foundation that was on fire.

Negotiated with the C-suite to shut the home-ownership platform down and pivot the team onto the conversion problem upstream. Took ownership of the lead gen rebuild.

Capitalized on a playbook built earlier for Zillow's mortgage rates and pre-approval flow: capture the right information from the homeowner at the moment of intent, present it to the pro in a usable shape, and get the pro on the phone fast with full project context so the first call wasn't cold. The fix sat across funnel UX and attribution infrastructure together; the data plumbing had to be right before the design changes meant anything.

Lead-to-project conversion rose 10–20x. Marketplace unit economics moved from broken to defensible. Pro-side expansion across categories and geographies became possible because the underlying funnel finally held.

The decision to call my own project and re-aim the team also reset Porch's internal credibility for product as a function. Product at Porch was now standing up to build what the data demanded, not what looked good in a board deck.